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Abstract—In residential homes, domestic energy storage in
batteries have been proposed by many to support the grid. To
foster its integration into the grid, virtual power plant (VPP)
technology is used. In this paper, we evaluate Peukert condition
of domestic battery storage within a given distribution level
market. An evolutionary algorithm is applied to optimize the
social welfare of stakeholders in a community VPP at different
levels of Peukert conditions. The dynamic load performance of
the VPP with respect to the grid requirements for demand-side
management (DSM) is also presented to evaluate the impact of the
Peukert effect on DSM. The results show that the social welfare
of the VPP stakeholders decreases as Peukert effects increase.
Index Terms—Battery, Cumulative Performance Index,
Optimisation, Prosumer, Virtual Power Plant.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE ongoing global restructuring of electric power utilities,
coupled with changing regulatory policies on energy usage
with regards to climate change, and the evolution of the
grid towards a smarter grid, are some of the key drivers
that would foster the adoption of distributed energy resources
(DER) in to the electricity grid [1]. DER are small units of
electricity-producing resources, storage, and controllable loads
that are connected to the distribution side of the grid to permit
modification of the load demand [2]. However, the small power
capacity of DER limits their participation in a free market
environment particularly at the wholesale level that requires
large capacity.
The inability of DER to negotiate at the power market is
an issue both to the DER owners and to the System Operator
(SO). From the DER owners’ perspectives, the inability to
participate in a free market reduces the value of their DER
assets, which further discourage the use of DER. From the
SO’s perspective, the DER is not assessable for supporting the
grid as the DER was installed in a fit-and-forget way [3]. The
grid penetration of a large number of DER is an issue. This
is in terms of the coordination required of a large number of
DER units with respect to the grid requirements for technical
service while considering the grid operational constraints and
the DER business case [4]. These challenges have led to the
unfolding of new concepts such as the virtual power plant
(VPP). Recently, the VPP stakeholders with extra energy to
trade are being studied to minimize non-commodity charges
by using virtual microgrids paradigm [5], [6].
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The VPP represents an internet of energy approach. It
aggregates a large number of different units of DER at the
distribution side of the grid and provides the platform for the
efficient management of these DER’s units, thereby becoming
an essential tool that is required for a paradigm shift from a
passive distribution network to an active distribution network.
These aggregated units have an overall capacity which could
enable the VPP function as a large power plant as well as a
large controllable load to ensure effective participation in the
power market at the wholesale level while providing assessable
means to the system operator for supporting the grid [7]. Under
the VPP paradigm, domestic consumers with energy storage
(Prosumers) would be able to offer flexibility to the grid
through demand-side management (DSM). This represents the
ability to modify the generation or consumption patterns of
their storage unit in response to price [8], [9].
Earlier studies have shown the benefits of energy storage
under VPP operation to the VPP stakeholders in terms of
providing the grid with its required load shape during DSM,
as well as cost minimization and profit maximization for
the prosumers, VPP aggregators and grid operators [10]–[12].
However, there is no clarity on how the Peukert condition of
battery storage can affect the benefits of the VPP stakeholders.
Peukert effect accounts for one of the major energy loss that
is associated with batteries like a lead-acid battery, etc. [13],
[14]. Under Peukert condition, the energy loss from the battery
increases as the energy discharge from the battery increases
beyond the manufacturers specified rated discharge. Typically,
battery manufacturers specify the nominal/actual capacity of
their battery based on their specified discharge rate. Under
Peukert condition the effective battery capacity decreases
as discharge energy from the battery increases beyond the
specified rate [13].
The effective capacity is the usable capacity available
from the battery. For example, a fully charged battery whose
nominal capacity is 1000AH (Ampere Hours) specified at
a discharge rate 20H (Hours) when discharged at 50A (or
20H discharge rate) would provide an effective capacity
of 1000AH. Also, the battery lifetime is better preserved.
However, if such a battery is discharged at a rate greater
than 50A or in less than 20H, the effective capacity of the
battery is less than 1000AH due to Peukert effect. In addition,
discharging the battery at less than 50A or greater than 20H
does not increase the effective capacity beyond 1000AH, as
that is practically unrealistic.
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Fig. 1: Architecture of the virtual power plant stakeholders model
In this paper, the Peukert effect of battery storage under
VPP operation is investigated. Optimization of the VPP with
respect to the stakeholders’ social welfare was done, and the
results are presented. We start with the the introduction of
the VPP stakeholders model in Section II and the analytical
model of the system under study in Section III. The results
are presented in Section IV and the conclusion in Section V.
II. VIRTUAL POWER PLANT STAKEHOLDERS MODEL
Fig. 1 represents an architectural framework of a community
VPP stakeholders’ model with N prosumers within a prosumer
community aggregated as a VPP. Each prosumer is equipped
with a domestic battery storage system that charges Echg(i,t) and
discharges Edis(i,t) units of energy ∀i = 1, · · · , N at t time
interval. The prosumer in the VPP community has a fixed
load demand of L(1,t),∀i = 1, · · · , N and sells energy at
βsellt selling price from battery to the VPP aggregator. α
buy
t
is the price at which the prosumer buy energy from the VPP
aggregator to meet its load demand which include charging
of battery, or the price at which the VPP aggregator sells
energy to the prosumer to meet its load demand which include
charging of battery at t. Eimpt and E
exp
t are the amount of
energy imported from the grid, and exported to grid by the
VPP aggregator respectively at t. δimpt and γ
exp
t are the VPP
aggregator import and export prices of energy to and from the
grid, respectively, at t.
Both the VPP aggregator and the ISO negotiates at the
wholesale level of the market, based on the price and energy
to be traded. Based on the wholesale market prices, the
VPP aggregator negotiates prices with prosumers at the
aggregation market for trading of energy. Ideally, the prices
at the aggregation market should reflect the time varying
nature of wholesale market prices. This is a key requirements
for efficient pricing [15]. Each of the VPP stakeholders are
discussed as follows.
A. Prosumer Stakeholder
In Fig. 1, each prosumer has a fixed load and battery storage
embedded inside their home and participates in the market
via the VPP aggregator with respect to providing DSM to
the external grid. The business transactions between the VPP
aggregator and the prosumers are done at the aggregation
market, which occurs at the distribution side of the grid. This
is because prosumers on their own do not have the required
power capacity in terms of the storage unit to negotiate directly
with the ISO at the external grid with respect to providing
DSM, as this negotiation occurs at the wholesale level of
the market. The VPP aggregator is given the authority by
the prosumers to make the negotiations on their behalf at
the wholesale market as well as to control the charge and
discharge energy from their battery. The prosumer buys energy
from the VPP aggregator for meeting its fixed load and for
charging its battery. The prosumer sells energy to the VPP
aggregator, which can be exported to the external grid for the
curtailment of the peak. The key motivation of the prosumers
in having their batteries aggregated as a VPP as well as
offering flexibility is to get financial incentive in order to
minimize their net energy purchasing cost. In order to achieve
this, prosumers require the VPP aggregator to set αbuyt and




(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N
correctly.
B. Virtual Power Plant Aggregator Stakeholder
At t, the VPP aggregator can buy energy from the grid
(Eimpt ) at a price δ
imp
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at price βsellt . The VPP aggregator buys E
imp
t in bulk
from the grid wholesale market to meet the prosumers load
demand (L(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N) as well as to charge the
prosumers’ battery (Echg(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N). In this model,
the VPP can combine both energies from the grid and the
prosumer’s battery to meet the load demand of all prosumers
(L(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N). The energy bought from each
prosumer (Edis(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N) is aggregated by the VPP
aggregator. The aggregated energy is first used within the
community to meet individual fixed load demand before sales
in the wholesale market to the grid (exported to the external
grid) by the VPP aggregator on behalf of the prosumers.
The VPP aggregator and the ISO at the external grid
negotiate and agrees δimpt and γ
exp
t in day ahead. This is based
on the grid’s day ahead demand as well as its requirement for
dynamic load levelling (peak and off-peak support) and the
willingness from the VPP aggregator to import and export
energy. This is to ensure DSM. The VPP aggregator has a day
ahead forecast of L(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N . The VPP aggregator






(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N . The
VPP aggregator uses Echg(i,t), and E
dis
(i,t) to control the amount of
energy to be imported Eimpt from the grid and exported E
exp
t









(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N should be set in
a way that it makes profit at the end of the day ahead market
assuming no error band.
C. ISO Stakeholder
The ISO at the external grid requires flexibility from the
VPP in terms of DSM in order to help balance the grid [16].
This balancing service involve peak shaving and valley filling
service. During peak period, the grid requires support from the
VPP. The VPP can support the grid by reducing its dynamic
load. This is by discharging of its prosumer battery Edis(i,t) to
meet the prosumers load demand L(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N , and
also by exporting energy Eexpt to the grid. During off-peak
period, the grid requires the VPP to increase its dynamic load,
by importing energy Eimpt from the grid to meet its prosumers
load as well charging of battery Echg(i,t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N . The
provision of peak and off-peak service by the VPP is to help
the grid flatten its demand as possible. Ideally, a flatter demand
is better for the grid due to a lower peak to average ratio. The
grid’s requirement for DSM are reflected by the setting of the




In this section, we present a detailed analytical modelling of
the VPP community energy trading given the domestic battery
storage system and also demonstrate the Peukert effects.
A. VPP Aggregator Profit
The VPP aggregators profit V profitt at each time interval t









V costt ∀t = 1, · · · , T (1)
where V revt and V
cost
t are the VPP revenue and cost
respectively at t. Both VPP revenue and cost are presented





























where i is an index number for the prosumer, N is the total
number of prosumers aggregated into the VPP.
B. Prosumer Net Cost
The prosumer’s net cost Pnett at each time interval t over








αbuyt (Li,t + E
chg
i,t )− βsellt Edisi,t . (3)
C. Battery Modelling
Under Peukert conditions when the battery is discharged
beyond its rated discharge Erate specified by the manufacturer,
the effective battery capacity available to the VPP is less than
the battery nominal capacity. The battery state of charge (SOC)
gives an information on the battery energy level. The SOC is
measured in percentage. The cumulative battery energy level













∀i = 1, · · · , N (4)
where Estored(i,t) is prosumer i cumulative battery energy level
in per unit measured at t, Einiti is prosumer i initial battery
energy level in per unit before participation in the day ahead
power market, Eidle(i,t) is the battery idle energy which we
assume is 0 and Eaff(i,t) is the equivalent of the discharge energy
from the battery’s perspective. This is unlike Edis(i,t) which is
the effective discharge energy the VPP sees from the battery.











, if Edisi,t > E
rate
(5)
where k is the Peukert constant. From (5), when Edis(i,t) ≤
Erate, the battery capacity loss is zero, otherwise the capacity
loss is greater. The battery capacity loss, Eloss(i,t), associated with














The effective battery capacity of prosumer i, namely Eeffi ,
when Edis(i,t) > E
rate
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where SOCi,t is the state of charge of prosumer i battery
measured in percentage during t and Ebatti is the actual battery
capacity in per unit of prosumer i. The stored energy in terms
of SOC at the end of T represents the prosumers unused
energy for DSM. This energy is a savings in terms of money
as well as an asset to the prosumer as it can be sold in future
markets to earn more incentive. The value for the stored energy
in terms of saved cash to the prosumers P savefinal is formulated
based on the average sell price of energy by the prosumers,














D. Cumulative Performance Index (CPI)
The VPP performance is determined by comparing both
the VPP dynamic load Edynt and the grid’s need for demand
side management [10]. The VPP dynamic load at t is the
energy imported from the grid by the VPP or the energy
exported to the grid by the VPP at t. The DSM need of
the grid at t is indicated by the exchange price λt at time
t. This is the differential price at the wholesale market that
encourage arbitrage of the storage under VPP operation in
order to provide DSM to the grid. This is calculated as the
difference between the import and export price of electricity
at t. This is presented as follows:
λt = δ
imp
t − γexpt ,
{
if λt > 0, grid requires off-peak service
if λt < 0, grid requires peak service.
(10)
When λt is positive, the grid requires the VPP to provide
off-peak service by increasing its dynamic load. The VPP
can increase its dynamic load by importing energy from the
grid. When λt is negative the grid requires the VPP to reduce
its dynamic load. The VPP can reduce its dynamic load by
discharging prosumer battery to support the load, as well as to
export energy to the grid. Therefore, when energy is imported
at t, Edynt is greater than zero. When energy is exported at
t, Edynt is less than zero. Both λt and E
dyn
t are represented
with the logic inputs At and Bt respectively, such that:
if λt > 0, At = 1, t = 1, · · · , T
if λt < 0, At = 0, t = 1, · · · , T
if Edynt > 0, Bt = 1, t = 1, · · · , T
if Edynt < 0, Bt = 0, t = 1, · · · , T
(11)
If grid requires off-peak service, it means the dynamic load
must be increased. On the other hand, if the grid requires peak
service, the dynamic load must be decreased. Based on this
criteria, a performance state Ct at time t is given as
Ct = (At ⊕Bt) ∀t = 1, · · · , T. (12)
Ct is the output of an EX-NOR logic combination of inputs
At and Bt. A logic state of 0 for Ct means that the VPP
is not performing well and the VPP dynamic load is not in
accordance with the grid’s requirement for DSM. A logic state
of 1 for Ct means that the VPP has performed well and the
dynamic load of the VPP is in accordance with the grid’s
requirement for DSM. Based on Ct, a new performance index
called the "Cumulative Performance Index" (CPI) of the VPP







The CPI is a tool to assess the performance of the VPP
with storage in terms of meeting the grid’s requirement for
DSM [10]. A higher CPI implies a lower cost to the grid.
It prevents the cost associated with ramping up and down of
utilities’ generation output during peak and off-peak period.
The monetized value of the CPI to the grid at t (Gvaluet )
was done considering λt where λt is the price that the grid
is willing to pay the VPP at t to avoid the ramping cost of







where |·| represents the absolute value operator.
E. Optimisation Problem Formulation
The optimization problem is the VPP stakeholders’ social
welfare F . Social welfare are packages that are given to the
VPP stakeholders to promote their wellbeing during DSM. To
formulate F , the objectives of each of the VPP stakeholders
during DSM is considered where F is a multi-objectives
function. It comprises of F1, F2, F3 and F4 where F1, F2, F3
and F4 represent the VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers net
cost, prosumers saved money in form of stored energy, and
the monetized value of the VPP’s CPI to the grid respectively.





(w1F1,t − w2F2,t + w3F3,t + w4F4,t) . (15)
Clearly, F can be interpreted as the social welfare of the
stakeholders and wj ,∀j = 1, · · · , 4 are the weights assigned
to the respective stakeholder objectives.
The goal of the prosumer in participating in the VPP
community small-scale market is to maximize its profit.
Consequently, our objective is to maximise the social welfare





subject to following battery inequality constraints:
Edismin,i ≤ Edis(i,t) ≤ Edismax,i ∀t = 1, · · · , T i = 1, · · · , N
(16b)
Echgmin,i ≤ Echg(i,t) ≤ Echgmax,i ∀t = 1, · · · , T i = 1, · · · , N
(16c)
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SOCimin ≤ SOCi,t ≤ SOCimax ∀t = 1, · · · , T i = 1, · · · , N
(16d)















Eimpt , if E
dyn
t > 0, t = 1, · · · , T
Eexpt , if E
dyn
t < 0, t = 1, · · · , T
0, if Edynt = 0, t = 1, · · · , T
(16f)
subject to the following network constraint:
Egridmax ≤ Edynt ∀t = 1, · · · , T (16g)
where Egridmax is the maximum energy exchange, which is to
prevent violation of the voltage limit of the network. This
was further considered as a black box model. Edis(min,i) and
Edis(max,i) are the minimum and maximum discharge energy at
any t that can be allocated to prosumer i battery. Echg(min,i)
and Echg(max,i) are the minimum and maximum charge energy
at any t that can be allocated to prosumer i battery. SOCimin
and SOCimax are the minimum and maximum state of charge
of charge of prosumer i battery can be subjected to.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The experiment was carried out by selecting k =
{1.0, 1.1, · · · , 1.6}, at an incremental step of 0.1. k =
1.0 means no Peukert effect. This so for some batteries
technologies. Ideally, k varies between 1.05 and 1.6 for
lead-acid batteries. Both Edis(min,i) and E
dis
(max,i) values were
initially chosen to be 0 and 10 per unit respectively in order
to be able to account for Peukert effect. These values were
later normalize to 0 and 1 per unit respectively base on the
maximum load of the prosumers [10]–[12]. The same also






i , and E
init
i were
initially chosen to be 120, 5, and 60 per unit respectively and
were normalize to 12, 0.5 and 6 per unit respectively. A 24
hours battery discharge rate specification was used, this can be
inferred from dividing Ebatti by E
rate
i . Ideally, most lead-acid
batteries are specified to discharge at 20 hours discharge rate
in order to obtain their nominal capacity. However, this could
varies. The pricing scheme and the load profile in [10]–[12]
was used as the input data in this experiment. Genetic
Algorithm was used to optimize F in (16) for N = 3, and
T = 24 [10], [11], by setting w1 = 0.257, w2 = 0.257, w3 =
0.229, w4 = 0.257. The VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers’
incentive and VPP’s performance at different values of k
is shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, the VPP aggregator has its
highest profit of 107 pence at k = 1.0, and its lowest
profit of 16 pence at k = 1.6. The prosumers have their
highest incentive of 209 pence at k = 1.0, and their lowest
incentive of -25 pence at k = 1.6. The VPP has its highest
performance of 100% at k = 1.0, and its lowest performance
of 37.5% at k = 1.6. The VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers’
incentive, and VPP performance decrease simultaneously as
the Peukert constant increases. This decrease is attributed to
the loss in the battery’s effective capacity when the battery
Fig. 2: VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers incentive and VPP’s
performance
Fig. 3: Final SOC of each prosumer’s battery
is subjected to high discharge energy under high Peukert
conditions. The final SOC of each prosumer’s battery at
different values of k is shown in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, there was an initial increase in all the prosumers’
battery final SOC from k = 1.0 to k = 1.1 and a decrease
in SOC from k = 1.1 to k = 1.2. However, from k = 1.3
to k = 1.6 it is observed that the final SOC of all the
prosumers’ battery increases. This depicts that when final
SOC is being accounted for as part of VPP objectives during
DSM, batteries under high peukert effect are more likely to
have a higher final SOC compared to the ones with lower
effect. This is because a high Peukert effect would result in
under-utilization of the battery in terms of discharging at the
peak period. Using k = 1.0 (i.e. no Peukert effect) as the point
of reference, the percentage change in the VPP stakeholders’
welfare was calculated for each incremental step size δk from
the reference point. This is to understand the impact of the
5
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Peukert effect. The percentage change in the stakeholders’
welfare is presented in Table I.












(%) (%) (%) (%)
δk = 0.1 -13.04 -16.80 -12.5 40.18
δk = 0.2 -15.77 -27.20 -16.7 -28.23
δk = 0.3 -22.35 -46.26 -25.00 -24.06
δk = 0.4 -52.95 -85.58 -45.83 372.12
δk = 0.5 -71.66 -105.04 -54.17 585.00
δk = 0.6 -85.04 -112.14 -62.50 719.87
In Table. I, at δk = 0.1, the negative impact of the
Peukert effect is highest on the prosumers incentives (i.e.
-16.80%). Only the mean value of the three prosumers final
SOC is positively affected (i.e. 40.18%). The negative impact
on the VPP aggregators profit, prosumers’ incentive and
VPP performance increases as δk approaches 0.6. However,
at δk = 0.6 there is a maximum positive impact on the
mean value of the final SOC (i.e. 719.87%). In this study,
it has been demonstrated that as the Peukert condition of
the battery increases, the VPP stakeholders’ social welfare in
terms of VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers’ incentive and
VPP’s performance decreases. Although, the batteries’ final
SOC is high at high Peukert conditions. This is as result of
the batteries been under-utilized in terms of discharging during
the peak period. This is an issue, particularly for DSM.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, a methodology for optimizing the VPP
stakeholders’ social welfare during demand-side management
(DSM) under different levels of peukert conditions of battery
storage has been proposed. The results clearly showed that as
the peukert effect increases, the stakeholders’ social welfare
in terms of VPP aggregator’s profit, prosumers’ incentive
and VPP’s performance decreases. Although, the batteries’
final state of charge is high at high peukert conditions. This
is as result of the batteries been under-utilized in terms
of discharging during the peak period. This is an issue
particularly during DSM where the grid requires peak load
support from the VPP. The reduction in the stakeholder’s social
welfare under high levels of Peukert conditions at the given
price implies that prices should be set in such a way that
it can account for the Peukert conditions of batteries under
VPP operation. It is important for both the VPP and the
grid operators to consider this. This work is been currently
extended to develop pricing strategies that recompense for
Peukert conditions of battery storage under VPP operation in
DSM. This would be validated with real lead acid battery, etc.
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